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authorTofu Linden <tofu.linden@lindenlab.com>2010-05-12 11:44:16 +0100
committerTofu Linden <tofu.linden@lindenlab.com>2010-05-12 11:44:16 +0100
commit3d39634cbd3abe4df7b9ce8d229e59c3087de713 (patch)
tree91c436bb6370e511fc2679e8f7b7ca22b7114f70 /indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp
parent4a3222d9c12812db70f2c9ec0050012d01155565 (diff)
parent1cee577ca0234eee7da243c85be8eb7524d691c7 (diff)
merge from viewer-public
Diffstat (limited to 'indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp')
-rw-r--r--indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp1612
1 files changed, 1612 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp b/indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..df55ccf142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/indra/newview/llsechandler_basic.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1612 @@
+/**
+ * @file llsechandler_basic.cpp
+ * @brief Security API for services such as certificate handling
+ * secure local storage, etc.
+ *
+ * $LicenseInfo:firstyear=2003&license=viewergpl$
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2003-2000, Linden Research, Inc.
+ *
+ * Second Life Viewer Source Code
+ * The source code in this file ("Source Code") is provided by Linden Lab
+ * to you under the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2.0
+ * ("GPL"), unless you have obtained a separate licensing agreement
+ * ("Other License"), formally executed by you and Linden Lab. Terms of
+ * the GPL can be found in doc/GPL-license.txt in this distribution, or
+ * online at http://secondlife.com/developers/opensource/gplv2
+ *
+ * There are special exceptions to the terms and conditions of the GPL as
+ * it is applied to this Source Code. View the full text of the exception
+ * in the file doc/FLOSS-exception.txt in this software distribution, or
+ * online at http://secondlife.com/developers/opensource/flossexception
+ *
+LLS * By copying, modifying or distributing this software, you acknowledge
+ * that you have read and understood your obligations described above,
+ * and agree to abide by those obligations.
+ *
+ * ALL LINDEN LAB SOURCE CODE IS PROVIDED "AS IS." LINDEN LAB MAKES NO
+ * WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, REGARDING ITS ACCURACY,
+ * COMPLETENESS OR PERFORMANCE.
+ * $/LicenseInfo$
+ */
+
+
+#include "llviewerprecompiledheaders.h"
+#include "llsecapi.h"
+#include "llsechandler_basic.h"
+#include "llsdserialize.h"
+#include "llviewernetwork.h"
+#include "llxorcipher.h"
+#include "llfile.h"
+#include "lldir.h"
+#include "llviewercontrol.h"
+#include <vector>
+#include <ios>
+#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <iostream>
+#include <iomanip>
+#include <time.h>
+
+
+
+// 128 bits of salt data...
+#define STORE_SALT_SIZE 16
+#define BUFFER_READ_SIZE 256
+std::string cert_string_from_asn1_string(ASN1_STRING* value);
+std::string cert_string_from_octet_string(ASN1_OCTET_STRING* value);
+
+LLSD _basic_constraints_ext(X509* cert);
+LLSD _key_usage_ext(X509* cert);
+LLSD _ext_key_usage_ext(X509* cert);
+LLSD _subject_key_identifier_ext(X509 *cert);
+LLSD _authority_key_identifier_ext(X509* cert);
+
+LLBasicCertificate::LLBasicCertificate(const std::string& pem_cert)
+{
+
+ // BIO_new_mem_buf returns a read only bio, but takes a void* which isn't const
+ // so we need to cast it.
+ BIO * pem_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)pem_cert.c_str(), pem_cert.length());
+ if(pem_bio == NULL)
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not allocate an openssl memory BIO." << LL_ENDL;
+ throw LLInvalidCertificate(this);
+ }
+ mCert = NULL;
+ PEM_read_bio_X509(pem_bio, &mCert, 0, NULL);
+ BIO_free(pem_bio);
+ if (!mCert)
+ {
+ throw LLInvalidCertificate(this);
+ }
+ _initLLSD();
+}
+
+
+LLBasicCertificate::LLBasicCertificate(X509* pCert)
+{
+ if (!pCert || !pCert->cert_info)
+ {
+ throw LLInvalidCertificate(this);
+ }
+ mCert = X509_dup(pCert);
+ _initLLSD();
+}
+
+LLBasicCertificate::~LLBasicCertificate()
+{
+ if(mCert)
+ {
+ X509_free(mCert);
+ }
+}
+
+//
+// retrieve the pem using the openssl functionality
+std::string LLBasicCertificate::getPem() const
+{
+ char * pem_bio_chars = NULL;
+ // a BIO is the equivalent of a 'std::stream', and
+ // can be a file, mem stream, whatever. Grab a memory based
+ // BIO for the result
+ BIO *pem_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!pem_bio)
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not allocate an openssl memory BIO." << LL_ENDL;
+ return std::string();
+ }
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(pem_bio, mCert);
+ int length = BIO_get_mem_data(pem_bio, &pem_bio_chars);
+ std::string result = std::string(pem_bio_chars, length);
+ BIO_free(pem_bio);
+ return result;
+}
+
+// get the DER encoding for the cert
+// DER is a binary encoding format for certs...
+std::vector<U8> LLBasicCertificate::getBinary() const
+{
+ U8 * der_bio_data = NULL;
+ // get a memory bio
+ BIO *der_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!der_bio)
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not allocate an openssl memory BIO." << LL_ENDL;
+ return std::vector<U8>();
+ }
+ i2d_X509_bio(der_bio, mCert);
+ int length = BIO_get_mem_data(der_bio, &der_bio_data);
+ std::vector<U8> result(length);
+ // vectors are guranteed to be a contiguous chunk of memory.
+ memcpy(&result[0], der_bio_data, length);
+ BIO_free(der_bio);
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+LLSD LLBasicCertificate::getLLSD() const
+{
+ return mLLSDInfo;
+}
+
+// Initialize the LLSD info for the certificate
+LLSD& LLBasicCertificate::_initLLSD()
+{
+
+ // call the various helpers to build the LLSD
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME] = cert_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(mCert));
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_ISSUER_NAME] = cert_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_get_issuer_name(mCert));
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME_STRING] = cert_string_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(mCert));
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_ISSUER_NAME_STRING] = cert_string_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_get_issuer_name(mCert));
+ ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_get_serialNumber(mCert);
+ if (sn != NULL)
+ {
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_SERIAL_NUMBER] = cert_string_from_asn1_integer(sn);
+ }
+
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_VALID_TO] = cert_date_from_asn1_time(X509_get_notAfter(mCert));
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_VALID_FROM] = cert_date_from_asn1_time(X509_get_notBefore(mCert));
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_SHA1_DIGEST] = cert_get_digest("sha1", mCert);
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_MD5_DIGEST] = cert_get_digest("md5", mCert);
+ // add the known extensions
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS] = _basic_constraints_ext(mCert);
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_KEY_USAGE] = _key_usage_ext(mCert);
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE] = _ext_key_usage_ext(mCert);
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTFIER] = _subject_key_identifier_ext(mCert);
+ mLLSDInfo[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER] = _authority_key_identifier_ext(mCert);
+ return mLLSDInfo;
+}
+
+// Retrieve the basic constraints info
+LLSD _basic_constraints_ext(X509* cert)
+{
+ LLSD result;
+ BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs = (BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL);
+ if(bs)
+ {
+ result = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ // Determines whether the cert can be used as a CA
+ result[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA] = (bool)bs->ca;
+
+ if(bs->pathlen)
+ {
+ // the pathlen determines how deep a certificate chain can be from
+ // this CA
+ if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ || !bs->ca)
+ {
+ result[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_PATHLEN] = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ result[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_PATHLEN] = (int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve the key usage, which specifies how the cert can be used.
+//
+LLSD _key_usage_ext(X509* cert)
+{
+ LLSD result;
+ ASN1_STRING *usage_str = (ASN1_STRING *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
+ if(usage_str)
+ {
+ result = LLSD::emptyArray();
+ long usage = 0;
+ if(usage_str->length > 0)
+ {
+ usage = usage_str->data[0];
+ if(usage_str->length > 1)
+ {
+ usage |= usage_str->data[1] << 8;
+ }
+ }
+ ASN1_STRING_free(usage_str);
+ if(usage)
+ {
+ if(usage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE));
+ if(usage & KU_NON_REPUDIATION) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_NON_REPUDIATION));
+ if(usage & KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT));
+ if(usage & KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT));
+ if(usage & KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT));
+ if(usage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_CERT_SIGN));
+ if(usage & KU_CRL_SIGN) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_CRL_SIGN));
+ if(usage & KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY));
+ if(usage & KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) result.append(LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY));
+ }
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve the extended key usage for the cert
+LLSD _ext_key_usage_ext(X509* cert)
+{
+ LLSD result;
+ EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = (EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
+ if(eku)
+ {
+ result = LLSD::emptyArray();
+ while(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku))
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *usage = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop(eku);
+ if(usage)
+ {
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(usage);
+ if (nid)
+ {
+ std::string sn = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+ result.append(sn);
+ }
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(usage);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve the subject key identifier of the cert
+LLSD _subject_key_identifier_ext(X509 *cert)
+{
+ LLSD result;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skeyid = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ if(skeyid)
+ {
+ result = cert_string_from_octet_string(skeyid);
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve the authority key identifier of the cert
+LLSD _authority_key_identifier_ext(X509* cert)
+{
+ LLSD result;
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID *akeyid = (AUTHORITY_KEYID *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ if(akeyid)
+ {
+ result = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ if(akeyid->keyid)
+ {
+ result[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_ID] = cert_string_from_octet_string(akeyid->keyid);
+ }
+ if(akeyid->serial)
+ {
+ result[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SERIAL] = cert_string_from_asn1_integer(akeyid->serial);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // we ignore the issuer name in the authority key identifier, we check the issue name via
+ // the the issuer name entry in the cert.
+
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve an openssl x509 object,
+// which must be freed by X509_free
+X509* LLBasicCertificate::getOpenSSLX509() const
+{
+ return X509_dup(mCert);
+}
+
+// generate a single string containing the subject or issuer
+// name of the cert.
+std::string cert_string_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_NAME* name)
+{
+ char * name_bio_chars = NULL;
+ // get a memory bio
+ BIO *name_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ // stream the name into the bio. The name will be in the 'short name' format
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(name_bio, name, 0, XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
+ int length = BIO_get_mem_data(name_bio, &name_bio_chars);
+ std::string result = std::string(name_bio_chars, length);
+ BIO_free(name_bio);
+ return result;
+}
+
+// generate an LLSD from a certificate name (issuer or subject name).
+// the name will be strings indexed by the 'long form'
+LLSD cert_name_from_X509_NAME(X509_NAME* name)
+{
+ LLSD result = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ int name_entries = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
+ for (int entry_index=0; entry_index < name_entries; entry_index++)
+ {
+ char buffer[32];
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, entry_index);
+
+ std::string name_value = std::string((const char*)M_ASN1_STRING_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)),
+ M_ASN1_STRING_length(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)));
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT* name_obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(entry);
+ OBJ_obj2txt(buffer, sizeof(buffer), name_obj, 0);
+ std::string obj_buffer_str = std::string(buffer);
+ result[obj_buffer_str] = name_value;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+// Generate a string from an ASN1 integer. ASN1 Integers are
+// bignums, so they can be 'infinitely' long, therefore we
+// cannot simply use a conversion to U64 or something.
+// We retrieve as a readable string for UI
+
+std::string cert_string_from_asn1_integer(ASN1_INTEGER* value)
+{
+ std::string result;
+ BIGNUM *bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(value, NULL);
+ if(bn)
+ {
+ char * ascii_bn = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+
+ if(ascii_bn)
+ {
+ result = ascii_bn;
+ OPENSSL_free(ascii_bn);
+ }
+ BN_free(bn);
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// Generate a string from an OCTET string.
+// we retrieve as a
+
+std::string cert_string_from_octet_string(ASN1_OCTET_STRING* value)
+{
+
+ std::stringstream result;
+ result << std::hex << std::setprecision(2);
+ for (int i=0; i < value->length; i++)
+ {
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ result << ":";
+ }
+ result << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << (int)value->data[i];
+ }
+ return result.str();
+}
+
+// Generate a string from an ASN1 integer. ASN1 Integers are
+// bignums, so they can be 'infinitely' long, therefore we
+// cannot simply use a conversion to U64 or something.
+// We retrieve as a readable string for UI
+
+std::string cert_string_from_asn1_string(ASN1_STRING* value)
+{
+ char * string_bio_chars = NULL;
+ std::string result;
+ // get a memory bio
+ BIO *string_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if(!string_bio)
+ {
+ // stream the name into the bio. The name will be in the 'short name' format
+ ASN1_STRING_print_ex(string_bio, value, ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253);
+ int length = BIO_get_mem_data(string_bio, &string_bio_chars);
+ result = std::string(string_bio_chars, length);
+ BIO_free(string_bio);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not allocate an openssl memory BIO." << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+// retrieve a date structure from an ASN1 time, for
+// validity checking.
+LLDate cert_date_from_asn1_time(ASN1_TIME* asn1_time)
+{
+
+ struct tm timestruct = {0};
+ int i = asn1_time->length;
+
+ if (i < 10)
+ {
+ return LLDate();
+ }
+ // convert the date from the ASN1 time (which is a string in ZULU time), to
+ // a timeval.
+ timestruct.tm_year = (asn1_time->data[0]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[1]-'0');
+
+ /* Deal with Year 2000 */
+ if (timestruct.tm_year < 70)
+ timestruct.tm_year += 100;
+
+ timestruct.tm_mon = (asn1_time->data[2]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[3]-'0') - 1;
+ timestruct.tm_mday = (asn1_time->data[4]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[5]-'0');
+ timestruct.tm_hour = (asn1_time->data[6]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[7]-'0');
+ timestruct.tm_min = (asn1_time->data[8]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[9]-'0');
+ timestruct.tm_sec = (asn1_time->data[10]-'0') * 10 + (asn1_time->data[11]-'0');
+
+#if LL_WINDOWS
+ return LLDate((F64)_mkgmtime(&timestruct));
+#else // LL_WINDOWS
+ return LLDate((F64)timegm(&timestruct));
+#endif // LL_WINDOWS
+}
+
+
+// Generate a string containing a digest. The digest time is 'ssh1' or
+// 'md5', and the resulting string is of the form "aa:12:5c:' and so on
+std::string cert_get_digest(const std::string& digest_type, X509 *cert)
+{
+ unsigned char digest_data[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+ unsigned int len = sizeof(digest_data);
+ std::stringstream result;
+ const EVP_MD* digest = NULL;
+ // we could use EVP_get_digestbyname, but that requires initializer code which
+ // would require us to complicate things by plumbing it into the system.
+ if (digest_type == "md5")
+ {
+ digest = EVP_md5();
+ }
+ else if (digest_type == "sha1")
+ {
+ digest = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return std::string();
+ }
+
+ X509_digest(cert, digest, digest_data, &len);
+ result << std::hex << std::setprecision(2);
+ for (unsigned int i=0; i < len; i++)
+ {
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ result << ":";
+ }
+ result << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << (int)digest_data[i];
+ }
+ return result.str();
+}
+
+
+// class LLBasicCertificateVector
+// This class represents a list of certificates, implemented by a vector of certificate pointers.
+// it contains implementations of the virtual functions for iterators, search, add, remove, etc.
+//
+
+// Find a certificate in the list.
+// It will find a cert that has minimally the params listed, with the values being the same
+LLBasicCertificateVector::iterator LLBasicCertificateVector::find(const LLSD& params)
+{
+ BOOL found = FALSE;
+ // loop through the entire vector comparing the values in the certs
+ // against those passed in via the params.
+ // params should be a map. Only the items specified in the map will be
+ // checked, but they must match exactly, even if they're maps or arrays.
+
+ for(iterator cert = begin();
+ cert != end();
+ cert++)
+ {
+
+ found= TRUE;
+ LLSD cert_info = (*cert)->getLLSD();
+ for (LLSD::map_const_iterator param = params.beginMap();
+ param != params.endMap();
+ param++)
+ {
+
+ if (!cert_info.has((std::string)param->first) ||
+ (!valueCompareLLSD(cert_info[(std::string)param->first], param->second)))
+ {
+ found = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found)
+ {
+ return (cert);
+ }
+ }
+ return end();
+}
+
+// Insert a certificate into the store. If the certificate already
+// exists in the store, nothing is done.
+void LLBasicCertificateVector::insert(iterator _iter,
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> cert)
+{
+ LLSD cert_info = cert->getLLSD();
+ if (cert_info.isMap() && cert_info.has(CERT_SHA1_DIGEST))
+ {
+ LLSD existing_cert_info = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ existing_cert_info[CERT_MD5_DIGEST] = cert_info[CERT_MD5_DIGEST];
+ if(find(existing_cert_info) == end())
+ {
+ BasicIteratorImpl *basic_iter = dynamic_cast<BasicIteratorImpl*>(_iter.mImpl.get());
+ mCerts.insert(basic_iter->mIter, cert);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// remove a certificate from the store
+LLPointer<LLCertificate> LLBasicCertificateVector::erase(iterator _iter)
+{
+
+ if (_iter != end())
+ {
+ BasicIteratorImpl *basic_iter = dynamic_cast<BasicIteratorImpl*>(_iter.mImpl.get());
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> result = (*_iter);
+ mCerts.erase(basic_iter->mIter);
+ return result;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+//
+// LLBasicCertificateStore
+// This class represents a store of CA certificates. The basic implementation
+// uses a pem file such as the legacy CA.pem stored in the existing
+// SL implementation.
+LLBasicCertificateStore::LLBasicCertificateStore(const std::string& filename)
+{
+ mFilename = filename;
+ load_from_file(filename);
+}
+
+void LLBasicCertificateStore::load_from_file(const std::string& filename)
+{
+ // scan the PEM file extracting each certificate
+ BIO* file_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if(file_bio)
+ {
+ if (BIO_read_filename(file_bio, filename.c_str()) > 0)
+ {
+ X509 *cert_x509 = NULL;
+ while((PEM_read_bio_X509(file_bio, &cert_x509, 0, NULL)) &&
+ (cert_x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ try
+ {
+ add(new LLBasicCertificate(cert_x509));
+ }
+ catch (...)
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Failure creating certificate from the certificate store file." << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+ X509_free(cert_x509);
+ cert_x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_free(file_bio);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not allocate a file BIO" << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+}
+
+
+LLBasicCertificateStore::~LLBasicCertificateStore()
+{
+}
+
+
+// persist the store
+void LLBasicCertificateStore::save()
+{
+ llofstream file_store(mFilename, llofstream::binary);
+ if(!file_store.fail())
+ {
+ for(iterator cert = begin();
+ cert != end();
+ cert++)
+ {
+ std::string pem = (*cert)->getPem();
+ if(!pem.empty())
+ {
+ file_store << (*cert)->getPem() << std::endl;
+ }
+ }
+ file_store.close();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not open certificate store " << mFilename << "for save" << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+}
+
+// return the store id
+std::string LLBasicCertificateStore::storeId() const
+{
+ // this is the basic handler which uses the CA.pem store,
+ // so we ignore this.
+ return std::string("");
+}
+
+
+//
+// LLBasicCertificateChain
+// This class represents a chain of certs, each cert being signed by the next cert
+// in the chain. Certs must be properly signed by the parent
+LLBasicCertificateChain::LLBasicCertificateChain(const X509_STORE_CTX* store)
+{
+
+ // we're passed in a context, which contains a cert, and a blob of untrusted
+ // certificates which compose the chain.
+ if((store == NULL) || (store->cert == NULL))
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "An invalid store context was passed in when trying to create a certificate chain" << LL_ENDL;
+ return;
+ }
+ // grab the child cert
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> current = new LLBasicCertificate(store->cert);
+
+ add(current);
+ if(store->untrusted != NULL)
+ {
+ // if there are other certs in the chain, we build up a vector
+ // of untrusted certs so we can search for the parents of each
+ // consecutive cert.
+ LLBasicCertificateVector untrusted_certs;
+ for(int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(store->untrusted); i++)
+ {
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> cert = new LLBasicCertificate(sk_X509_value(store->untrusted, i));
+ untrusted_certs.add(cert);
+
+ }
+ while(untrusted_certs.size() > 0)
+ {
+ LLSD find_data = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ LLSD cert_data = current->getLLSD();
+ // we simply build the chain via subject/issuer name as the
+ // client should not have passed in multiple CA's with the same
+ // subject name. If they did, it'll come out in the wash during
+ // validation.
+ find_data[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME_STRING] = cert_data[CERT_ISSUER_NAME_STRING];
+ LLBasicCertificateVector::iterator issuer = untrusted_certs.find(find_data);
+ if (issuer != untrusted_certs.end())
+ {
+ current = untrusted_certs.erase(issuer);
+ add(current);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+// subdomain wildcard specifiers can be divided into 3 parts
+// the part before the first *, the part after the first * but before
+// the second *, and the part after the second *.
+// It then iterates over the second for each place in the string
+// that it matches. ie if the subdomain was testfoofoobar, and
+// the wildcard was test*foo*bar, it would match test, then
+// recursively match foofoobar and foobar
+
+bool _cert_subdomain_wildcard_match(const std::string& subdomain,
+ const std::string& wildcard)
+{
+ // split wildcard into the portion before the *, and the portion after
+
+ int wildcard_pos = wildcard.find_first_of('*');
+ // check the case where there is no wildcard.
+ if(wildcard_pos == wildcard.npos)
+ {
+ return (subdomain == wildcard);
+ }
+
+ // we need to match the first part of the subdomain string up to the wildcard
+ // position
+ if(subdomain.substr(0, wildcard_pos) != wildcard.substr(0, wildcard_pos))
+ {
+ // the first portions of the strings didn't match
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ // as the portion of the wildcard string before the * matched, we need to check the
+ // portion afterwards. Grab that portion.
+ std::string new_wildcard_string = wildcard.substr( wildcard_pos+1, wildcard.npos);
+ if(new_wildcard_string.empty())
+ {
+ // we had nothing after the *, so it's an automatic match
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ // grab the portion of the remaining wildcard string before the next '*'. We need to find this
+ // within the remaining subdomain string. and then recursively check.
+ std::string new_wildcard_match_string = new_wildcard_string.substr(0, new_wildcard_string.find_first_of('*'));
+
+ // grab the portion of the subdomain after the part that matched the initial wildcard portion
+ std::string new_subdomain = subdomain.substr(wildcard_pos, subdomain.npos);
+
+ // iterate through the current subdomain, finding instances of the match string.
+ int sub_pos = new_subdomain.find_first_of(new_wildcard_match_string);
+ while(sub_pos != std::string::npos)
+ {
+ new_subdomain = new_subdomain.substr(sub_pos, std::string::npos);
+ if(_cert_subdomain_wildcard_match(new_subdomain, new_wildcard_string))
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ sub_pos = new_subdomain.find_first_of(new_wildcard_match_string, 1);
+
+
+ }
+ // didn't find any instances of the match string that worked in the subdomain, so fail.
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+// RFC2459 does not address wildcards as part of it's name matching
+// specification, and there is no RFC specifying wildcard matching,
+// RFC2818 does a few statements about wildcard matching, but is very
+// general. Generally, wildcard matching is per implementation, although
+// it's pretty similar.
+// in our case, we use the '*' wildcard character only, within each
+// subdomain. The hostname and the CN specification should have the
+// same number of subdomains.
+// We then iterate that algorithm over each subdomain.
+bool _cert_hostname_wildcard_match(const std::string& hostname, const std::string& common_name)
+{
+ std::string new_hostname = hostname;
+ std::string new_cn = common_name;
+
+ // find the last '.' in the hostname and the match name.
+ int subdomain_pos = new_hostname.find_last_of('.');
+ int subcn_pos = new_cn.find_last_of('.');
+
+ // if the last char is a '.', strip it
+ if(subdomain_pos == (new_hostname.length()-1))
+ {
+ new_hostname = new_hostname.substr(0, subdomain_pos);
+ subdomain_pos = new_hostname.find_last_of('.');
+ }
+ if(subcn_pos == (new_cn.length()-1))
+ {
+ new_cn = new_cn.substr(0, subcn_pos);
+ subcn_pos = new_cn.find_last_of('.');
+ }
+
+ // Check to see if there are any further '.' in the string.
+ while((subcn_pos != std::string::npos) && (subdomain_pos != std::string::npos))
+ {
+ // snip out last subdomain in both the match string and the hostname
+ // The last bit for 'my.current.host.com' would be 'com'
+ std::string cn_part = new_cn.substr(subcn_pos+1, std::string::npos);
+ std::string hostname_part = new_hostname.substr(subdomain_pos+1, std::string::npos);
+
+ if(!_cert_subdomain_wildcard_match(new_hostname.substr(subdomain_pos+1, std::string::npos),
+ cn_part))
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ new_hostname = new_hostname.substr(0, subdomain_pos);
+ new_cn = new_cn.substr(0, subcn_pos);
+ subdomain_pos = new_hostname.find_last_of('.');
+ subcn_pos = new_cn.find_last_of('.');
+ }
+ // check to see if the most significant portion of the common name is '*'. If so, we can
+ // simply return success as child domains are also matched.
+ if(new_cn == "*")
+ {
+ // if it's just a '*' we support all child domains as well, so '*.
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return _cert_subdomain_wildcard_match(new_hostname, new_cn);
+
+}
+
+// validate that the LLSD array in llsd_set contains the llsd_value
+bool _LLSDArrayIncludesValue(const LLSD& llsd_set, LLSD llsd_value)
+{
+ for(LLSD::array_const_iterator set_value = llsd_set.beginArray();
+ set_value != llsd_set.endArray();
+ set_value++)
+ {
+ if(valueCompareLLSD((*set_value), llsd_value))
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+void _validateCert(int validation_policy,
+ const LLPointer<LLCertificate> cert,
+ const LLSD& validation_params,
+ int depth)
+{
+
+ LLSD current_cert_info = cert->getLLSD();
+ // check basic properties exist in the cert
+ if(!current_cert_info.has(CERT_SUBJECT_NAME) || !current_cert_info.has(CERT_SUBJECT_NAME_STRING))
+ {
+ throw LLCertException(cert, "Cert doesn't have a Subject Name");
+ }
+
+ if(!current_cert_info.has(CERT_ISSUER_NAME_STRING))
+ {
+ throw LLCertException(cert, "Cert doesn't have an Issuer Name");
+ }
+
+ // check basic properties exist in the cert
+ if(!current_cert_info.has(CERT_VALID_FROM) || !current_cert_info.has(CERT_VALID_TO))
+ {
+ throw LLCertException(cert, "Cert doesn't have an expiration period");
+ }
+ if (!current_cert_info.has(CERT_SHA1_DIGEST))
+ {
+ throw LLCertException(cert, "No SHA1 digest");
+ }
+
+ if (validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_TIME)
+ {
+
+ LLDate validation_date(time(NULL));
+ if(validation_params.has(CERT_VALIDATION_DATE))
+ {
+ validation_date = validation_params[CERT_VALIDATION_DATE];
+ }
+
+ if((validation_date < current_cert_info[CERT_VALID_FROM].asDate()) ||
+ (validation_date > current_cert_info[CERT_VALID_TO].asDate()))
+ {
+ throw LLCertValidationExpirationException(cert, validation_date);
+ }
+ }
+ if (validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_SSL_KU)
+ {
+ if (current_cert_info.has(CERT_KEY_USAGE) && current_cert_info[CERT_KEY_USAGE].isArray() &&
+ (!(_LLSDArrayIncludesValue(current_cert_info[CERT_KEY_USAGE],
+ LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))) ||
+ !(_LLSDArrayIncludesValue(current_cert_info[CERT_KEY_USAGE],
+ LLSD((std::string)CERT_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)))))
+ {
+ throw LLCertKeyUsageValidationException(cert);
+ }
+ // only validate EKU if the cert has it
+ if(current_cert_info.has(CERT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) && current_cert_info[CERT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE].isArray() &&
+ (!_LLSDArrayIncludesValue(current_cert_info[CERT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE],
+ LLSD((std::string)CERT_EKU_SERVER_AUTH))))
+ {
+ throw LLCertKeyUsageValidationException(cert);
+ }
+ }
+ if (validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_CA_KU)
+ {
+ if (current_cert_info.has(CERT_KEY_USAGE) && current_cert_info[CERT_KEY_USAGE].isArray() &&
+ (!_LLSDArrayIncludesValue(current_cert_info[CERT_KEY_USAGE],
+ (std::string)CERT_KU_CERT_SIGN)))
+ {
+ throw LLCertKeyUsageValidationException(cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // validate basic constraints
+ if ((validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) &&
+ current_cert_info.has(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) &&
+ current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS].isMap())
+ {
+ if(!current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS].has(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA) ||
+ !current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS][CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA])
+ {
+ throw LLCertBasicConstraintsValidationException(cert);
+ }
+ if (current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS].has(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_PATHLEN) &&
+ ((current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS][CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_PATHLEN].asInteger() != 0) &&
+ (depth > current_cert_info[CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS][CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_PATHLEN].asInteger())))
+ {
+ throw LLCertBasicConstraintsValidationException(cert);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+bool _verify_signature(LLPointer<LLCertificate> parent,
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> child)
+{
+ bool verify_result = FALSE;
+ LLSD cert1 = parent->getLLSD();
+ LLSD cert2 = child->getLLSD();
+ X509 *signing_cert = parent->getOpenSSLX509();
+ X509 *child_cert = child->getOpenSSLX509();
+ if((signing_cert != NULL) && (child_cert != NULL))
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert);
+
+
+ if(pkey)
+ {
+ int verify_code = X509_verify(child_cert, pkey);
+ verify_result = ( verify_code > 0);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Could not validate the cert chain signature, as the public key of the signing cert could not be retrieved" << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ LL_WARNS("SECAPI") << "Signature verification failed as there are no certs in the chain" << LL_ENDL;
+ }
+ if(child_cert)
+ {
+ X509_free(child_cert);
+ }
+ if(signing_cert)
+ {
+ X509_free(signing_cert);
+ }
+ return verify_result;
+}
+
+// validate the certificate chain against a store.
+// There are many aspects of cert validatioin policy involved in
+// trust validation. The policies in this validation algorithm include
+// * Hostname matching for SSL certs
+// * Expiration time matching
+// * Signature validation
+// * Chain trust (is the cert chain trusted against the store)
+// * Basic constraints
+// * key usage and extended key usage
+// TODO: We should add 'authority key identifier' for chaining.
+// This algorithm doesn't simply validate the chain by itself
+// and verify the last cert is in the certificate store, or points
+// to a cert in the store. It validates whether any cert in the chain
+// is trusted in the store, even if it's not the last one.
+void LLBasicCertificateChain::validate(int validation_policy,
+ LLPointer<LLCertificateStore> ca_store,
+ const LLSD& validation_params)
+{
+
+ if(size() < 1)
+ {
+ throw LLCertException(NULL, "No certs in chain");
+ }
+ iterator current_cert = begin();
+ LLSD current_cert_info = (*current_cert)->getLLSD();
+ LLSD validation_date;
+ if (validation_params.has(CERT_VALIDATION_DATE))
+ {
+ validation_date = validation_params[CERT_VALIDATION_DATE];
+ }
+
+ if (validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_HOSTNAME)
+ {
+ if(!validation_params.has(CERT_HOSTNAME))
+ {
+ throw LLCertException((*current_cert), "No hostname passed in for validation");
+ }
+ if(!current_cert_info.has(CERT_SUBJECT_NAME) || !current_cert_info[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME].has(CERT_NAME_CN))
+ {
+ throw LLInvalidCertificate((*current_cert));
+ }
+
+ LL_INFOS("SECAPI") << "Validating the hostname " << validation_params[CERT_HOSTNAME].asString() <<
+ "against the cert CN " << current_cert_info[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME][CERT_NAME_CN].asString() << LL_ENDL;
+ if(!_cert_hostname_wildcard_match(validation_params[CERT_HOSTNAME].asString(),
+ current_cert_info[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME][CERT_NAME_CN].asString()))
+ {
+ throw LLCertValidationHostnameException(validation_params[CERT_HOSTNAME].asString(),
+ (*current_cert));
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ int depth = 0;
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> previous_cert;
+ // loop through the cert chain, validating the current cert against the next one.
+ while(current_cert != end())
+ {
+
+ int local_validation_policy = validation_policy;
+ if(current_cert == begin())
+ {
+ // for the child cert, we don't validate CA stuff
+ local_validation_policy &= ~(VALIDATION_POLICY_CA_KU |
+ VALIDATION_POLICY_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // for non-child certs, we don't validate SSL Key usage
+ local_validation_policy &= ~VALIDATION_POLICY_SSL_KU;
+ if(!_verify_signature((*current_cert),
+ previous_cert))
+ {
+ throw LLCertValidationInvalidSignatureException(previous_cert);
+ }
+ }
+ _validateCert(local_validation_policy,
+ (*current_cert),
+ validation_params,
+ depth);
+
+ // look for a CA in the CA store that may belong to this chain.
+ LLSD cert_llsd = (*current_cert)->getLLSD();
+ LLSD cert_search_params = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ // is the cert itself in the store?
+ cert_search_params[CERT_SHA1_DIGEST] = cert_llsd[CERT_SHA1_DIGEST];
+ LLCertificateStore::iterator found_store_cert = ca_store->find(cert_search_params);
+ if(found_store_cert != ca_store->end())
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // is the parent in the cert store?
+
+ cert_search_params = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ cert_search_params[CERT_SUBJECT_NAME_STRING] = cert_llsd[CERT_ISSUER_NAME_STRING];
+ if (cert_llsd.has(CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER))
+ {
+ LLSD cert_aki = cert_llsd[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER];
+ if(cert_aki.has(CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_ID))
+ {
+ cert_search_params[CERT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTFIER] = cert_aki[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_ID];
+ }
+ if(cert_aki.has(CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SERIAL))
+ {
+ cert_search_params[CERT_SERIAL_NUMBER] = cert_aki[CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SERIAL];
+ }
+ }
+ found_store_cert = ca_store->find(cert_search_params);
+
+ if(found_store_cert != ca_store->end())
+ {
+ LLSD foo = (*found_store_cert)->getLLSD();
+ // validate the store cert against the depth
+ _validateCert(validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+ (*found_store_cert),
+ LLSD(),
+ depth);
+
+ // verify the signature of the CA
+ if(!_verify_signature((*found_store_cert),
+ (*current_cert)))
+ {
+ throw LLCertValidationInvalidSignatureException(*current_cert);
+ }
+ // successfully validated.
+ return;
+ }
+ previous_cert = (*current_cert);
+ current_cert++;
+ depth++;
+ }
+ if (validation_policy & VALIDATION_POLICY_TRUSTED)
+ {
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> untrusted_ca_cert = (*this)[size()-1];
+ // we reached the end without finding a trusted cert.
+ throw LLCertValidationTrustException((*this)[size()-1]);
+
+ }
+}
+
+
+// LLSecAPIBasicHandler Class
+// Interface handler class for the various security storage handlers.
+
+// We read the file on construction, and write it on destruction. This
+// means multiple processes cannot modify the datastore.
+LLSecAPIBasicHandler::LLSecAPIBasicHandler(const std::string& protected_data_file,
+ const std::string& legacy_password_path)
+{
+ mProtectedDataFilename = protected_data_file;
+ mProtectedDataMap = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ mLegacyPasswordPath = legacy_password_path;
+
+}
+
+LLSecAPIBasicHandler::LLSecAPIBasicHandler()
+{
+}
+
+
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::init()
+{
+ mProtectedDataMap = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ if (mProtectedDataFilename.length() == 0)
+ {
+ mProtectedDataFilename = gDirUtilp->getExpandedFilename(LL_PATH_USER_SETTINGS,
+ "bin_conf.dat");
+ mLegacyPasswordPath = gDirUtilp->getExpandedFilename(LL_PATH_USER_SETTINGS, "password.dat");
+
+ mProtectedDataFilename = gDirUtilp->getExpandedFilename(LL_PATH_USER_SETTINGS,
+ "bin_conf.dat");
+ std::string store_file = gDirUtilp->getExpandedFilename(LL_PATH_USER_SETTINGS,
+ "CA.pem");
+ // copy the CA file to a user writable location so we can manipulate it.
+ // for this provider, by using a user writable file, there is a risk that
+ // an attacking program can modify the file, but OS dependent providers
+ // will reduce that risk.
+ // by using a user file, modifications will be limited to one user if
+ // we read-only the main file
+ if (!LLFile::isfile(store_file))
+ {
+
+ std::string ca_file_path = gDirUtilp->getExpandedFilename(LL_PATH_APP_SETTINGS, "CA.pem");
+ llifstream ca_file(ca_file_path.c_str(), llifstream::binary | llifstream::in);
+ llofstream copied_store_file(store_file.c_str(), llofstream::binary | llofstream::out);
+
+ while(!ca_file.fail())
+ {
+ char buffer[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+ ca_file.read(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ copied_store_file.write(buffer, ca_file.gcount());
+ }
+ ca_file.close();
+ copied_store_file.close();
+ }
+ LL_INFOS("SECAPI") << "Loading certificate store from " << store_file << LL_ENDL;
+ mStore = new LLBasicCertificateStore(store_file);
+ }
+ _readProtectedData(); // initialize mProtectedDataMap
+ // may throw LLProtectedDataException if saved datamap is not decryptable
+}
+LLSecAPIBasicHandler::~LLSecAPIBasicHandler()
+{
+ _writeProtectedData();
+}
+
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::_readProtectedData()
+{
+ // attempt to load the file into our map
+ LLPointer<LLSDParser> parser = new LLSDXMLParser();
+ llifstream protected_data_stream(mProtectedDataFilename.c_str(),
+ llifstream::binary);
+
+ if (!protected_data_stream.fail()) {
+ int offset;
+ U8 salt[STORE_SALT_SIZE];
+ U8 buffer[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+ U8 decrypted_buffer[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+ int decrypted_length;
+ unsigned char MACAddress[MAC_ADDRESS_BYTES];
+ LLUUID::getNodeID(MACAddress);
+ LLXORCipher cipher(MACAddress, MAC_ADDRESS_BYTES);
+
+ // read in the salt and key
+ protected_data_stream.read((char *)salt, STORE_SALT_SIZE);
+ offset = 0;
+ if (protected_data_stream.gcount() < STORE_SALT_SIZE)
+ {
+ throw LLProtectedDataException("Config file too short.");
+ }
+
+ cipher.decrypt(salt, STORE_SALT_SIZE);
+
+ // totally lame. As we're not using the OS level protected data, we need to
+ // at least obfuscate the data. We do this by using a salt stored at the head of the file
+ // to encrypt the data, therefore obfuscating it from someone using simple existing tools.
+ // We do include the MAC address as part of the obfuscation, which would require an
+ // attacker to get the MAC address as well as the protected store, which improves things
+ // somewhat. It would be better to use the password, but as this store
+ // will be used to store the SL password when the user decides to have SL remember it,
+ // so we can't use that. OS-dependent store implementations will use the OS password/storage
+ // mechanisms and are considered to be more secure.
+ // We've a strong intent to move to OS dependent protected data stores.
+
+
+ // read in the rest of the file.
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_DecryptInit(&ctx, EVP_rc4(), salt, NULL);
+ // allocate memory:
+ std::string decrypted_data;
+
+ while(protected_data_stream.good()) {
+ // read data as a block:
+ protected_data_stream.read((char *)buffer, BUFFER_READ_SIZE);
+
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, decrypted_buffer, &decrypted_length,
+ buffer, protected_data_stream.gcount());
+ decrypted_data.append((const char *)decrypted_buffer, protected_data_stream.gcount());
+ }
+
+ // RC4 is a stream cipher, so we don't bother to EVP_DecryptFinal, as there is
+ // no block padding.
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ std::istringstream parse_stream(decrypted_data);
+ if (parser->parse(parse_stream, mProtectedDataMap,
+ LLSDSerialize::SIZE_UNLIMITED) == LLSDParser::PARSE_FAILURE)
+ {
+ throw LLProtectedDataException("Config file cannot be decrypted.");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::_writeProtectedData()
+{
+ std::ostringstream formatted_data_ostream;
+ U8 salt[STORE_SALT_SIZE];
+ U8 buffer[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+ U8 encrypted_buffer[BUFFER_READ_SIZE];
+
+
+ if(mProtectedDataMap.isUndefined())
+ {
+ LLFile::remove(mProtectedDataFilename);
+ return;
+ }
+ // create a string with the formatted data.
+ LLSDSerialize::toXML(mProtectedDataMap, formatted_data_ostream);
+ std::istringstream formatted_data_istream(formatted_data_ostream.str());
+ // generate the seed
+ RAND_bytes(salt, STORE_SALT_SIZE);
+
+
+ // write to a temp file so we don't clobber the initial file if there is
+ // an error.
+ std::string tmp_filename = mProtectedDataFilename + ".tmp";
+
+ llofstream protected_data_stream(tmp_filename.c_str(),
+ llofstream::binary);
+ try
+ {
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, EVP_rc4(), salt, NULL);
+ unsigned char MACAddress[MAC_ADDRESS_BYTES];
+ LLUUID::getNodeID(MACAddress);
+ LLXORCipher cipher(MACAddress, MAC_ADDRESS_BYTES);
+ cipher.encrypt(salt, STORE_SALT_SIZE);
+ protected_data_stream.write((const char *)salt, STORE_SALT_SIZE);
+
+ while (formatted_data_istream.good())
+ {
+ formatted_data_istream.read((char *)buffer, BUFFER_READ_SIZE);
+ if(formatted_data_istream.gcount() == 0)
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+ int encrypted_length;
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, encrypted_buffer, &encrypted_length,
+ buffer, formatted_data_istream.gcount());
+ protected_data_stream.write((const char *)encrypted_buffer, encrypted_length);
+ }
+
+ // no EVP_EncrypteFinal, as this is a stream cipher
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ protected_data_stream.close();
+ }
+ catch (...)
+ {
+ // it's good practice to clean up any secure information on error
+ // (even though this file isn't really secure. Perhaps in the future
+ // it may be, however.
+ LLFile::remove(tmp_filename);
+ throw LLProtectedDataException("Error writing Protected Data Store");
+ }
+
+ // move the temporary file to the specified file location.
+ if((((LLFile::isfile(mProtectedDataFilename) != 0) &&
+ (LLFile::remove(mProtectedDataFilename) != 0))) ||
+ (LLFile::rename(tmp_filename, mProtectedDataFilename)))
+ {
+ LLFile::remove(tmp_filename);
+ throw LLProtectedDataException("Could not overwrite protected data store");
+ }
+}
+
+// instantiate a certificate from a pem string
+LLPointer<LLCertificate> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::getCertificate(const std::string& pem_cert)
+{
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> result = new LLBasicCertificate(pem_cert);
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+
+// instiate a certificate from an openssl X509 structure
+LLPointer<LLCertificate> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::getCertificate(X509* openssl_cert)
+{
+ LLPointer<LLCertificate> result = new LLBasicCertificate(openssl_cert);
+ return result;
+}
+
+// instantiate a chain from an X509_STORE_CTX
+LLPointer<LLCertificateChain> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::getCertificateChain(const X509_STORE_CTX* chain)
+{
+ LLPointer<LLCertificateChain> result = new LLBasicCertificateChain(chain);
+ return result;
+}
+
+// instantiate a cert store given it's id. if a persisted version
+// exists, it'll be loaded. If not, one will be created (but not
+// persisted)
+LLPointer<LLCertificateStore> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::getCertificateStore(const std::string& store_id)
+{
+ return mStore;
+}
+
+// retrieve protected data
+LLSD LLSecAPIBasicHandler::getProtectedData(const std::string& data_type,
+ const std::string& data_id)
+{
+
+ if (mProtectedDataMap.has(data_type) &&
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type].isMap() &&
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type].has(data_id))
+ {
+ return mProtectedDataMap[data_type][data_id];
+ }
+
+ return LLSD();
+}
+
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::deleteProtectedData(const std::string& data_type,
+ const std::string& data_id)
+{
+ if (mProtectedDataMap.has(data_type) &&
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type].isMap() &&
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type].has(data_id))
+ {
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type].erase(data_id);
+ }
+}
+
+
+//
+// persist data in a protected store
+//
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::setProtectedData(const std::string& data_type,
+ const std::string& data_id,
+ const LLSD& data)
+{
+ if (!mProtectedDataMap.has(data_type) || !mProtectedDataMap[data_type].isMap()) {
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type] = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ }
+
+ mProtectedDataMap[data_type][data_id] = data;
+}
+
+//
+// Create a credential object from an identifier and authenticator. credentials are
+// per grid.
+LLPointer<LLCredential> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::createCredential(const std::string& grid,
+ const LLSD& identifier,
+ const LLSD& authenticator)
+{
+ LLPointer<LLSecAPIBasicCredential> result = new LLSecAPIBasicCredential(grid);
+ result->setCredentialData(identifier, authenticator);
+ return result;
+}
+
+// Load a credential from the credential store, given the grid
+LLPointer<LLCredential> LLSecAPIBasicHandler::loadCredential(const std::string& grid)
+{
+ LLSD credential = getProtectedData("credential", grid);
+ LLPointer<LLSecAPIBasicCredential> result = new LLSecAPIBasicCredential(grid);
+ if(credential.isMap() &&
+ credential.has("identifier"))
+ {
+
+ LLSD identifier = credential["identifier"];
+ LLSD authenticator;
+ if (credential.has("authenticator"))
+ {
+ authenticator = credential["authenticator"];
+ }
+ result->setCredentialData(identifier, authenticator);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // credential was not in protected storage, so pull the credential
+ // from the legacy store.
+ std::string first_name = gSavedSettings.getString("FirstName");
+ std::string last_name = gSavedSettings.getString("LastName");
+
+ if ((first_name != "") &&
+ (last_name != ""))
+ {
+ LLSD identifier = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ LLSD authenticator;
+ identifier["type"] = "agent";
+ identifier["first_name"] = first_name;
+ identifier["last_name"] = last_name;
+
+ std::string legacy_password = _legacyLoadPassword();
+ if (legacy_password.length() > 0)
+ {
+ authenticator = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ authenticator["type"] = "hash";
+ authenticator["algorithm"] = "md5";
+ authenticator["secret"] = legacy_password;
+ }
+ result->setCredentialData(identifier, authenticator);
+ }
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+// Save the credential to the credential store. Save the authenticator also if requested.
+// That feature is used to implement the 'remember password' functionality.
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::saveCredential(LLPointer<LLCredential> cred, bool save_authenticator)
+{
+ LLSD credential = LLSD::emptyMap();
+ credential["identifier"] = cred->getIdentifier();
+ if (save_authenticator)
+ {
+ credential["authenticator"] = cred->getAuthenticator();
+ }
+ LL_INFOS("SECAPI") << "Saving Credential " << cred->getGrid() << ":" << cred->userID() << " " << save_authenticator << LL_ENDL;
+ setProtectedData("credential", cred->getGrid(), credential);
+ //*TODO: If we're saving Agni credentials, should we write the
+ // credentials to the legacy password.dat/etc?
+ _writeProtectedData();
+}
+
+// Remove a credential from the credential store.
+void LLSecAPIBasicHandler::deleteCredential(LLPointer<LLCredential> cred)
+{
+ LLSD undefVal;
+ deleteProtectedData("credential", cred->getGrid());
+ cred->setCredentialData(undefVal, undefVal);
+ _writeProtectedData();
+}
+
+// load the legacy hash for agni, and decrypt it given the
+// mac address
+std::string LLSecAPIBasicHandler::_legacyLoadPassword()
+{
+ const S32 HASHED_LENGTH = 32;
+ std::vector<U8> buffer(HASHED_LENGTH);
+ llifstream password_file(mLegacyPasswordPath, llifstream::binary);
+
+ if(password_file.fail())
+ {
+ return std::string("");
+ }
+
+ password_file.read((char*)&buffer[0], buffer.size());
+ if(password_file.gcount() != buffer.size())
+ {
+ return std::string("");
+ }
+
+ // Decipher with MAC address
+ unsigned char MACAddress[MAC_ADDRESS_BYTES];
+ LLUUID::getNodeID(MACAddress);
+ LLXORCipher cipher(MACAddress, 6);
+ cipher.decrypt(&buffer[0], buffer.size());
+
+ return std::string((const char*)&buffer[0], buffer.size());
+}
+
+
+// return an identifier for the user
+std::string LLSecAPIBasicCredential::userID() const
+{
+ if (!mIdentifier.isMap())
+ {
+ return mGrid + "(null)";
+ }
+ else if ((std::string)mIdentifier["type"] == "agent")
+ {
+ return (std::string)mIdentifier["first_name"] + "_" + (std::string)mIdentifier["last_name"];
+ }
+ else if ((std::string)mIdentifier["type"] == "account")
+ {
+ return (std::string)mIdentifier["account_name"];
+ }
+
+ return "unknown";
+
+}
+
+// return a printable user identifier
+std::string LLSecAPIBasicCredential::asString() const
+{
+ if (!mIdentifier.isMap())
+ {
+ return mGrid + ":(null)";
+ }
+ else if ((std::string)mIdentifier["type"] == "agent")
+ {
+ return mGrid + ":" + (std::string)mIdentifier["first_name"] + " " + (std::string)mIdentifier["last_name"];
+ }
+ else if ((std::string)mIdentifier["type"] == "account")
+ {
+ return mGrid + ":" + (std::string)mIdentifier["account_name"];
+ }
+
+ return mGrid + ":(unknown type)";
+}
+
+
+bool valueCompareLLSD(const LLSD& lhs, const LLSD& rhs)
+{
+ if (lhs.type() != rhs.type())
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (lhs.isMap())
+ {
+ // iterate through the map, verifying the right hand side has all of the
+ // values that the left hand side has.
+ for (LLSD::map_const_iterator litt = lhs.beginMap();
+ litt != lhs.endMap();
+ litt++)
+ {
+ if (!rhs.has(litt->first))
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Now validate that the left hand side has everything the
+ // right hand side has, and that the values are equal.
+ for (LLSD::map_const_iterator ritt = rhs.beginMap();
+ ritt != rhs.endMap();
+ ritt++)
+ {
+ if (!lhs.has(ritt->first))
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!valueCompareLLSD(lhs[ritt->first], ritt->second))
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (lhs.isArray())
+ {
+ LLSD::array_const_iterator ritt = rhs.beginArray();
+ // iterate through the array, comparing
+ for (LLSD::array_const_iterator litt = lhs.beginArray();
+ litt != lhs.endArray();
+ litt++)
+ {
+ if (!valueCompareLLSD(*ritt, *litt))
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ ritt++;
+ }
+
+ return (ritt == rhs.endArray());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // simple type, compare as string
+ return (lhs.asString() == rhs.asString());
+ }
+
+}